The intricate world of international diplomacy and defense procurement recently presented former President Donald Trump with one of his most complex challenges: deciding which nations would gain access to the highly advanced F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. This decision, fraught with geopolitical implications, centers on the delicate balance of power in the Middle East and the United States’ enduring commitment to regional security.
Central to this strategic conundrum is the longstanding US policy of ensuring Israel maintains a “qualitative military edge” (QME) over its neighbors. This commitment means that any transfer of advanced weaponry to other regional actors must not diminish Israel’s superior military capabilities, a principle that inevitably complicates the sale of cutting-edge platforms like the F-35.
One prominent nation at the heart of the F-35 debate has been Turkey, a NATO member with a complex relationship with the United States. Despite its initial involvement in the Joint Strike Fighter program, Turkey was ultimately expelled in 2020 following its acquisition of Russia’s S-400 Triumf air defense system, which Washington deemed a security risk to the F-35 platform.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also emerged as a key player, particularly after normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. There was considerable speculation that the UAE would become the first Arab nation to acquire the F-35, a move that initially raised concerns in Israel before they seemingly relented. However, the deal ultimately did not materialize for other reasons.
Beyond Turkey and the UAE, other nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Morocco have also expressed interest in the F-35, further intensifying the diplomatic tightrope walk. Granting these US allies access to such advanced military aviation technology while upholding Israel’s QME presents a formidable policy challenge for Washington.
One proposed solution to this complex equation involves the United States potentially limiting the capabilities of F-35 jets sold to other Middle Eastern nations. This approach aims to allow allied countries to modernize their air forces for regional security concerns, particularly against adversaries like Iran, without undermining Israel’s long-held military supremacy.
Another strategic avenue under consideration involves the development and potential future export of the Boeing F-47, a sixth-generation fighter being developed under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. Should this advanced stealth fighter become available, offering it to Israel could secure its qualitative military edge, even as the F-35 becomes more widely distributed among other friendly Arab states.
Ultimately, the challenge lies in crafting an arrangement where all parties feel adequately secure and strategically empowered in an increasingly volatile region. This intricate balance of defense capabilities, political alliances, and diplomatic assurances continues to define US foreign policy in the Middle East, with the F-35 Lightning II serving as a critical piece of the puzzle.
